Public sector pricing in a fiscal context by Heady, Christopher
Policy,  Panning,  and  Rceach
WORKINCV  PAPERS
Public  Eoonomhs  7
Country  Economics  Department




in a Fiscal Context
Christopher  Heady
If administered  prices are to generate  revenues, they should
deviate  from marginal  cost and should be determined  on the
basis  of their  economy-wide  effects,  without  regard  to financial
targets. It is better  to raise  prices  above  marginal  cost through
taxes  than by raising  the price  received  by the enterprise.
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Administered prices should deviate from mar-  Imposing financial constraints may be an
ginal cost if they are to be used as instruments to  inefficient method of achieving fiscal objectives.
generate revenue.  It is better to decide prices on the basis of their
economy-wide effects without regard to finan-
The analysis is based on the Bank's two-step  cial targets - and then, if necessary, to impose
approach to public sector pricing: first calculat-  financial targets that are consistent with those
ing marginal cost, and then adjusting it to  prices.
account for other factors.  The aim is to show
how those adjustments should be made to  The author argues that it is better to raise
account for fiscal concems.  Such adjustments  prices above marginal cost through taxes than by
are not widely used at present.  raising the price received by the enterprise.
The appropriate basis for pricing in the first  Metering problems prevent direct observa-
step, the author contends, is a weighted average  tion of the use of publicly produced goods - a
of short and long-term marginal costs.  problem that particularly affects road user
chargers.  The author discusses how to set
Deviations from marginal cost in the second  charges in the face of metering difficulties,
step are shown to depend on their revenue-  stressing the need to set uniforn  charges and to
raising, distortionary, and distributional effects.  make indirect charges on inputs.
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The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to set  out the  principles  that  should
underlie  the  setting  of public  sector  prices  in  LDCs,  and specify  the  data
requirements for applying those principles.  The paper pays particular
attention  to the use of public  sector  prices  as instruments  of revenue-
generation for the central government,  and thus reflects the current
concern  over  budgetary  problems  in  LDCs.  Although  the  principles  discussed
in the  paper  apply  to all  parts  of the  public  sector,  special  consideration
is given  to the  problems  of  pricing  in the  transport  sector.
The  analysis  adopts  the  Bank's  two  step  approach  to public  sector
pricing:  first calculating  marginal  cost, and then adjusting  it to take
account  of other factors.  Adjustments  for fiscal  reasons  are not widely
used at present, perhaps partly because the methods for making such
adjustments  are not  widely  known.  This paper  sets out  the techniques  that
should  be applied.
As the  two step approach requires an initial calculation  of
marginal  cost, the paper starts  with a consideration  of the appropriate
concept of marginal  cost. Should  short-run  or long-run  marginal  cost be
used? The paper argues for the use of short-run  marginal  cost pricing
because of its ability to promote the full use of productive  capacity.
However,  the argument  rests  on the ability  to change  prices  when capacity
utilization  changes,  and the appropriate  definition  of the short-run  is
therefore  the  period  over  which  prices  cannot  be changed.
The  greater  variability  in  prices  based  on short-run  marginal  cost
(as  compared  to  prices  based  on some  concept  of  long-run  marginal  cost)  can
cause  difficulty  for  some  consumers  who  require  knowledge  of future  prices.
The importance  of this  consideration  varies  from one industry  to another.
For those  industries  where  it  is im.portant,  a  weighted  average  of short  and
long-run marginal cost can be used, with the weights reflecting the
relativc  importance  of  capacity  utilization  and  price  stability.
The paper  then turns  to fiscal  considerations  and shows that  the
imposition  of financial  constraints  on enterprises  can be an inefficient
method  of achieving  fiscal  objectives,  because  they  neglect  the  differences
in the distortionary  costs  of raising  ievenue  in different  industries.  It
is better to decide prices on the basis of their economy-wide  effects
without  regard  to financial  targets.  If financial  targets  are important  in
providing  incentives  to enterprises,  the levels  of these  targets  can then
be determined  on the  basis of the pricing  policy  that is best for each
enterprise.  Such  an approach  would  reverse  a common  situation  where  prices
are  determined  by financial  constraints.
The paper shows  how prices  can be decided  using information  on
their revenue-raising, distortionary and distributional  effects.  The
consideration  of distortionary  effects  shows  that  it  is generally  better  to
raise price above marginal  costs only in sales to final consumers.  The
raising  of prices in sales  to firms  can yield the same revenue  but will
have a greater  distortionary  cost.  However,  it is  often  impractical  to tax
final  sales  and  the taxation  of intermediates  can then  be a useful  revenue
source.- ii  -
It is also shown that the raising of the price received by
enterprises  may produce an incentive  for inefficient  investment.  It is
therefore  better  to raise  consumer  prices  by the  use  of taxes  whenever  this
is  possible.
The final section of the paper looks at the consequences of
metering problems that prevent the direct observation  of the use of
publicly  produced  goods.  This is a problem  that  particularly  affects  road
transport  and the  discussion  therefore  concentrates  on the  setting  of road
user  charges.  There  are  two  related  problems.  First,  it is  difficult  to tax
the  use of differenc  roads  at different  rates.  Second,  it is difficult  to
tax  road  use  directly  and  so inputs  into  road  use  must  be taxed  instead.
In relation  to the first  difficulty,  the paper shows  that where
different  road  uses  must  be charged  at the  same  rate,  the  charge  should  be
a  weighted  average  of the  marginal  cost  of each  road  use.
In relation to the second difficulty,  the paper shows that a
uniform  tax  on the inputs  into road  use (gasoline,  vehicles,  tires,  etc.)
is  equivalent  to the  same  rate  of tax  on road  use  itself.  It  also  shows  how
these tax rates on in',uts  should  be modified  to take account  of taxes
elsewhere  in  the  economy  and  it  demonstrates  that,  if  some  inputs  cannot  be
taxed, the taxes on other inputs should be adjusted  by a factor  that
depends  on their  substitutability  with  the  untaxed  input.
The  taxes  on inputs  derived  in  this  section  are  not  distortionary;
they are  correcting the externality involved in road use. They are,
therefore,  not subject  to the argument  against  taxing  intermediate  goods,
and should  be applied  equally  to firms  and final  consumers.  However,  the
principles  set out  earlier  in the  paper  can  be used to decide  on possible
additional  revenue-raising  taxes  on inputs  into road  use. Such additional
taxes  would be subject  to the (qualified)  argument  against intermediate
good taxation  outlined  above.SECTION  1:  ITRODUCTION
1.1  The purpose of this paper  is to set out the principles that should
underlie  the  setting  of public  sector  prices  in  LDCs,  and  discuss  the  data
requirements for applying those principles.  The paper pays particular
attention  to the use of public  sector  p-cices  as instruments  of revenue-
generation  for  the  central  government.  Although  the  principles  discussed  in
the  paper apply to all parts of the public  sector,  special  consideration
will  be given  to the  problems  of pricing  in the  transport  sector.
1.2  Current  World  Bank policy  on public  sector  pricing  is reviewed  in
Julius and Alicbusan (1986) and involves  a two-step  approach:  first,
marginal cost is calculated;  second,  marginal  cost is adjusted  to take
account  of such  factors  as  metering  problems,  distributional  objectives  and
financial  objectives.  While this approach  is fundamentally  sound,  Julius
and  Alicbusan  found  that  the  second-step  adjustments  are  often  not  made in
practice.  This  was  particularly  true  of adjustments  to take  account  of the
fiscal  constraints  facing  the  government.  Failure  to  make  these  adjustments
implies  that governments  are not making  the  best use of opportunities  to
raise  revenue  through  the  setting  of public  sector  prices.  Such  neglect  of
revenue raising opportunities  is serious  for LDCs which typically  rely
heavily  on taxes  on international  trade  to raise  revenue.  There  has been
growing  concern  about the  harmful  effects  of trade  taxes  and a resulting
pressure  to find  other,  less  distortionary,  sources  of government  revenue.
1.3  In these  circumstances,  the  setting  of public  seccor  prices  above
cost has  considerable attractions as a method of raising revenue,
especially  in countries  that have difficulty  operating  effective  general
sales  taxes.  Hovever,  the  question  of whether  this  method  should  be used in
a particular  country  depends  on the viability  of alternative  sources  of
revenue  and  their  relative  distortionary  effects.  Even  when the  decision  ismade to use public  sector  pricing  to raise  revenue,  the extent  to which
individual  prices should  be adjusted  for fiscal  reasons  will depend  on
various  characteristics  of the demands  for the goods in question  and the
existence  of taxes  elsewhere  in  the  economy.  The  factors  that  should  govern
these adjustments must be carefully articulated before the two-step
approach  can become operational. In addition,  any policy that involves
significant  departures  from  marginal  cost  pricing  must take  account  of the
effect that it has on investment  decisions.  This paper is addressed  to
those  two issues,  and thus seeks  to provide  a basis for the incorporation
of fiscal  considerations  into  the  setting  of public  sector  prices.
1.4  In  order  to  concentrate  on  the  incorporation  of  fiscal
considerations  into  public  sector  pricing,  this  paper  will  not  address  many
other issues  that relate  to public  sector  pricing  such as "second  best"
adjustments  to deal  with  market  imperfections,  shadow  pricing  of inputs  and
income  distribution  (except  in so far  as  higher  public  sector  prices  might
affect  income  distribution).  However,  there  are two issues  that must be
given  some attention  here. First,  the  question  of whether  short-  or long-
run  marginal  cost  should  be used  in the  first-step  is crucial  as it is  the
base  to which  all  the adjustments  are  made.  Second,  no pricing
recommendations  can  have  praetical  application  unless  they  take  account  of
the practical difficulties  of measuring  and collecting  charges for the
publicly produced good, a particularly  important  point in the case of
transport.
1.5  The  plan  of the  paper  is therefore  as follows.  Section  2  considers
the appropriate  coriept  of marginal  cost.  Section  3 discusses  the  way in
which this marginal cost should  be modified  to take account  of fiscal
objectives.  Section 4 considers  how metering  problems  might modify the
recommendations  of Section  3.  Section  5 provides  a summary  and  concluding
remarks.-3-
SECTION  2:  THE  APPROPRIATE  CONCEPT  OF  MARGINAL  COST
2.1  The  purpose  of this  section  is to lay  out  the  considerations  that
should  determine  the  marginal  cost concept  to be used as a basis for the
determination  of public sector  prtc'-. The main issue  here is whether
short-run marginal cost should  be used, or whether the marginal cost
concept  should  also include  some allowance  for capital  costs.  World Bank
practice  in this  area is  not  uniform:  Walters  (1968)  recommends  the  use of
short-run  marginal  cost as a basis  of road  user charges,  while  Munasinghe
(1981) suggests the use  of long-run marginal cost as the basis  of
electricity  charges.
2.2  Although  Saunders,  Warford  and Mann (1977)  show that there are
several ways of defining marginal cost to include capital costs, the
discussion  here  will concentrate  on the  basic  issue  of whether  they  should
be included  at all. This section  therefore  starts  with ai.  explanation  of
the advantages  of short-run  marginal  cost  and discusses  its  application  to
transport pricing.  The main argument  against  short-run  marginal  cost,
price  variability,  is then analyzed.  Finally,  the  relationship  of pricing
to  investment  decisions  is considered.
A.  The  Advantages  of Short-Run  Marginal  Cost
2.3  The argument  for using short-run  marginal  cost as a basis for
public  sector  pricing  is  most  easily  seen in  a situation  where  the  capital
stock ia fixed an.1  the only way in which output  can be altered is by
changing  the level of variable  inputs.  The social  cost of producing  one
more unit of a good (or  the benefit  in producing  one less unit) is then
clearly  the  cost  of the  extra  variable  inputs  required  to produce  an extra
unit of output,  in other  words the short-run  marginal  cost. Allocative- 4 -
efficiency  then requires  that it is this cost that should  face consumers
who  a:e  choosing  how to allocate  their  expenditure.
2.4  In the  long-run,  changes  in  output  may  also  be met  by changing  the
quantity  of capital.  However  that is an investment  decision,  to which  we
will turn  below,  and there  is a real sense  in  which  pricing  decisions  are
always  made in the "short-run".  If there  is spare  capacity  in an industry,
lowering the price to short-run  marginal  cost will uike better  use of
resources.  The  increased demand  involves no commitment to capital
expenditure  because the price can be raised  in the future  if the spare
capacity  disappears.
2.5  The rationale  for using short-run  marginal  cost is even clearer
for  an industry  that is operating  above  design  capacity.  In extreme  cases
the  industry  will face  an absolute  limit  on its  output  and  the  charging  of
long-run  marginal cost would not clear the market without the use of
rationing.  In this case,  short-run  marginal  cost is the  cost to consumers
of reallocating  one unit of output,  which is simply  the market  clearing
price.  Therefore  short-run  marginal  cost  prici..g  allocates  the  fixed  output
efficiently.  In less  extreme  cases,  operation  above  design  capacity  simply
implies  that short-run  marginal  cost is above  long-run  marginal  cost. In
this case  the  use of long-run  marginal  cost  would  involve  charging  a price
below  the  social  cost  of extra  units  of output  and  result  in misallocation
of resources.  The fact that output can be increased  more cheaply  by
expanding  capacity  is no reason  for  lowering  the  price  before  the  capacity
has  been increased.
2.6  The  observation  that  short-run  marginal  cost  will be greater  than
long-run  marginal  cost when a firm or industry  is operating  above  design
capacity  is important  in understanding  how short-run  marginal  cost  pricing
allocates  demand  between  industries.  As an example,  consider  the  allocation- 5 -
of freight  transport  between  roads  and railways.  Variable  operating  costs
form a higher  proportion  of total  operating  costs  for road transport  than
for  railways  and  it  might  therefore  be thought  that  (assuming  equal  average
costs) railways will have a lower short-run marginal cost and would
therefore  take  most of the  freight.  However,  this  would  only  necessarily  be
the case  if both industries  were operating  below  capacity.  If the  railways
were operating  above  design  capacity,  short-run  marginal  costs (including
congestion  costs)  will be above long-run  marginal  costs.  In this case,
short-run  marginal  cost  pricing  would  induce  freight  to move towards  road
transport,  unless  that  industry  was  also  operating  well above  capacity.
2.7  It might  be that the railways  are operating  well below  capacity,
and then short-run marginal coat pricing will give them a competitive
advantage.  However,  given that there is excess  capacity  on the railways,
short-run  marginal  cost  pricing  would  produce  the  most  efficient  allocation
of  freight.  The  excess  capacity might  be  due  to mistakes  or the
indivisibility  of investment  or some  other  cause,  but  whatever  the  cause  it
provides an opportunity for (socially)  inexpensive  transport  while it
lasts.
2.8  This analysis  indicates  that the question  of the right balance
between  road  and rail is one that  should  be resolved  when investments  are
decided.  Once the investments  have been made, they should  be put to the
best use by using short-run  marginal  cost pricing.  Investment  policy  will
be considered  below, but first the issue of price variability  must be
considered.
B.  The  Consequences  of Price  Variabilitv
2.9  The most signif'cant  criticism  of the use of short-run  marginal
cost is that it produces  prices  that  vary a great  deal.  It  must of course
be accepted  that long-run  marginal  cost  varies  as demand  changes,  but notby as much as short-run  marginal  cost. In fact,  it is the  variability  of
short-run  marginal  cost that gives it the advantages  discussed  above,  of
ensuring full utilization of existing capacity. Nonetheless, it is
necessary  to  consider  whether  this  price  variability  also  has
disadvantages.
2.10  There  are two types  of disadvantage  that  might  follow  from  price
variability. First, there is the administrative cost and political
difficulty  for  the  government  in  altering  the  prices.  Second,  there  is the
uncertainty  for  the  consumer  in  not  knowing  what the  price  is  going  to  be.
2.11  Before  discussing  each  in turn,  it should  be noted  that  there  ar
some sorts of price variability that do not involve either sort of
disadvantage.  For example,  the  use of peak-load  pricing  schedulesl  that
set  different  prices  for  electricity  or  public  transport  at different  times
of day, or even different  days,  do not cause  administrative  costs (other
than the metering difficulties discukssed  in Section 4) or political
difficulty  because the  whole schedule  can be announced  at one time.  The
fact  that  the  whole  schedule  is  announced  at one  time  also  means  that  there
is  no uncertainty  for  the  consumer.  The  sort  of price  variability  that  does
have disadvantages  are  price  changes  whose  timing  is  hard to predict,  such
as increases  in short-run  marginal  costs as an industry  approaches  full
capacity  and falls in short-run  marginal  cost as capacity  is increased.
These  changes  are  hard to  predict  for  several  reasons,  including  difficulty
in predicting  demand  changes,  poor  knowledge  of how marginal  costs  change
with output  and  difficulties  in  predicting  when  new capacity  will  be ready
for  use.
1/  The setting of optimal two-part  tariffs is discussed in Feldstein
(1972b).2.12  The administrative  costs of price changes  can be significant,
involving a  formal decision-making  process  and the need to disseminata
information  on the  new  prices.  Such  costs  mean that  both  public  enterprises
and the government  will not want to be continually  changing  prices.  This
will be particularly  true if the  government  expects  political  difficulties
in  raising  prices.
2.13  Any requirement  that  prices  should  remain  constant  for  a  period  of
time will affect the arguments advanced above in favor of short-run
marginal  cost  pricing,  because  they  relied  on the  possibility  of altering
prices  when capacity  utilization  changed.  Therefore,  the length  of time
that should  be regarded  as "the short-run"  should  be the length  of time
over  which  the  price  cannot  be changed.
2.14  For example,  suppose  that prices  can only be changed  once every
six  months.  In such  a  case,  the  cost  of increased  output  throughout  the  six
month  period  must  be considered  in  making  pricing  decisions.  A three  month
period  of  excess  capacity  may  not  justify lowering prices  to the
temporarily  low  short-run  marginal  cost if the  remaining  three  months  will
include periods of very heavy capacity  utilization.  In other words,  an
average  value  of  short-run marginal  cost must be  used. A  further
complication  is that,  in  some industries,  six  months  may  be long  enough  to
permit  considerable  changes  in capacity  and so increases  in output  within
one pricing period may be partly  met by capacity  increases.  Thus some
capital  costs  are included  in  the  appropriate  definition  of  variable  costs,
and therefore  in short-run  marginal  cost. There will then be less of a
distinction  between  short  and  long-run  marginal  cost.-8-
and therefore  in short-run  marginal  cost. There  will then be less of a
distinction  between  short  and  long-run  marginal  cost.
2.15  The effect  of price  variability  on consumers  is usually  regarded
as the  more important  disadvantage  of short-run  marginal  cost  pricing.  The
idea is that price uncertainty  makes it difficult  for consumers  to make
investment decisions that are complementary  to the consumption  of the
publicly  produced  good.  For example,  a firm  will  want to know  about  future
road  use charges  when  deciding  on the  location  of a factory,  or a  household
will  want to  know  about  the  future  costs  of different  energy  sources  before
investing  in a water-heater.  These  examples  make it clear  that it is not
the price variability Rer  se that is the problem, but  the lack of
information.  If the firm  knows about  future  increases  in road  use charges
the  investment  decision  can  be made  properly,  but if  they  simply  think  that
the  current  low  charges  will continue  indefinitely  they  will probable  make
the  wrong  decision.
2.16  These  observations  provide  something  of a case for  using  long-run
marginal  cost as a basis for pricing  decisions  because,  as a more stable
price,  it contains  more  information about future price  levels. In
principle,  the informational  problem  cuuld  be overcome  without  sacrificing
the efficiency of short-run marginal cost pricing by making official
forecasts  of average  future  price  levels.  However,  the  forecast  might  lack
credibility  in  practice. 3
3/  A more  useful  possibility  would  be for  the  public  enterprises  to offer
fixed  price  contracts  at a price somewhat  above  the expected  average
price (the differential  being justified  by the costs  of unresponsive
demand).  This might be attractive to purchasers for whom price
variability  is  a  particularly  serious  problem.- 9  -
2.17  It is  difficult  to  quantify  the  effects  of  uncertainty  produced  by
short-run  marginal  cost pricing  because  of the difficulty  of  knowing  how
people  form  their  price  expectations.  However,  some  qualitative
observations  can  be made.  First,  the  advantages  of short-run  marginal  cost
pricing  are greater  in those  cases  where  capacity  is different  from  demand
for  long  periods  of time.  Second,  the  costs  of  errors  in  price  expectations
are more serious where the investment  significantly  constrains future
choice.  The first  observation  gives  weight  to Walter's  suggestion  of using
short-run  marginal  cost in road user charges,  because of the long time
often  required  to  undertake  investment  in  new  roads.  The  second  observation
gives  weight  to the idea  of using  long-run  marginal  cost for electricity,
because  investment  in  electrical  equipment  commits  the  owner  to that  energy
source  for  some  considerable  time.
2.18  In principle,  the informational  problem  could  be overcome  without
sacrificing  the efficiency  of short-run  marginal  cost pricing,  by making
official  forecasts  of average  future  price  levels. However,  the forecast
might  lack  credibility  in  practice. A more  useful  possibility  would  be for
public  enterprises  to  offer  fixed  price  contracts  at a price  somewhat  above
the expected  average  price (the  differential  being  justified  by the  costs
of unresponsive  demand).  This  might  be attractive  to purchasers  for  whom
price  variability  is a  particularly  serious  problem.
2.19  It is  difficult  to quantify  the  effects  of  uncertainty  produced  by
short-run  marginal  cost pricing  because  of the difficulty  of knowing  how
people  form  their  price  expectations.  However,  some  qualitative
observations  can  be made.  First,  the  advantages  of short-run  marginal  cost
pricing  are greater  in those  cases  where  capacity  is different  from  demand
for  long periods  of  time.  Second,  the  costs of errors  in price
expectations  are  more  serious  where  the  investment  significantly  constrains- 10  -
relationship  with pricing  policy, issues  of uncertainty,  irreversibility
and adjustment  costs  are ignored. Their  relevance  to investment  theory  is
explained  in  Nickell  (1978).
2.20  Consider first the case of infinitely  divisible  investment.  If
short-run  marginal  cost is used for pricing,  any extra  investment  will  be
fully  used and the criterion  for investment  is simply  that the  value of
extra  output  is  as great  its  cost.  This  is equivalent  to requiring  that  the
price should  be as great as the long-run  marginal  cost. But as price is
equal to short-run  marginal  cost, this means that investment  should  be
undertaken  whenever short-run  marginal  cost is above long-run  marginal
cost.  If long-run  marginal  cost is used for  pricing,  output  will not  be
directly  affected  by investment.  Instead,  investment  should  be viewed  as a
possible method of reducing  the cost of output, the level of which is
determined  by the quantity  demanded  at a price  equal  to long-run  marginal
cost.  Additional  investment  will reduce  cost if output  is higher  than the
level  at  which  short  and  long-run  average  cost  are  equal.  But  at that  level
of output,  short-run  marginal  cost is  higher  than long-run  marginal  cost.
Thus  the  investment  criteria  are  the  same,  whichever  pricing  rule  is  used.
2.21  This similarity in investment  rules in the case of infinitely
divisible  investment  is not really  surprising  because,  under the optimal
investment rule, short-run and long-run marginal costs are equal. If
capacity  is always  adjusted  so that long and short-run  average  costs  are
equal,  then  the  corresponding  marginal  costs  are  equal.  In  other  words,  the
two pricing rules generate the same prices so long as investment is
optimal.  This implies  that  differences  in the  outcomes  of the  pricing  rules
only  occur  if  either  investment  is non-optimal  or  investment  is
indivisible.  The  implications of non-optimal investment have been
considered  above,  and so the rest of this section  will be concerned  with
the  effect  of  pricing  rules  on indivisible  investment  decisions.- 11  -
2.22  The indivisibility  of investment  implies that capacity  cannot
continually  keep pace.  Most of the  time  production  will either  be below  or
above  the  optimal  level  of  capacity  utilization.  It is  in these
circumstances  that  the  pricing  rules  have  different  outcomes.
2.23  If short-run  marginal  cost pricing  is used, prices  will rise as
capacity  utilization  increases,  reducing  demand  and moderating  the extra
costs  of producing  above  design  capacity.  When  new investment  is installed
there  will be temporary  excess  capacity  and  prices  will fall to encourage
its  use. The decision  on the timing  of the  new investment  is then  one of
comparing  the  costs  of earlier  investment  with the  benefits.  The cost of
earlier  investment  is the opportunity  cost of diverting  investment  from
other  uses (the  interest  payments  over  the  period  that  it is  moved  forward,
if  the  capital  markets  are  perfect).  The  benefit  of extra  investment  is  not
simply the value of the additional  product (as in the divisible  case)
because  the  price  will  change. Instead,  it  will  be the  increase  in  the  sum
of consumer  and  producer  surplus. 3 The optimal  time for investment  will
be when the  cost  and  benefit  of slightly  earlier  (or  later)  investment  are
equal.
2.24  If long-run  marginal  cost pricing  is used,  prices  will not rise
and fall with capacity  utilization.  This means that there is no need to
make producer  and consumer  surplus  calculations  in undertaking  investment
decisions.  The  only  question  is  when  should  investment  be timed  in  order  to
minimize  the  cost  of production.  The  cost  of earlier  investment  is the  same
as above,  but the  benefit  is the  reduction  in production  costs.  As before,
optimal  timing  is determined  by the  point  at which the  costs  and  benefits
of slightly  altered  timing  are  equal.
3/  This  is explained  in  Little  and  Mirrlees  (1974).- 12 -
2.25  It should be  clear that, neglecting the problems of price
variability, short-run marginal cost pricing leads to more efficient
investment for two reasons. First, the increase in price as capacity
utilization  increases  has the  effect  of reducing  demand  and  thus  preventing
the  need for  premature  investment.  Second,  the  reduction  in  price  after  new
investment  is installed  ensures  that  full  advantage  is taken  of any excess
capacity. However, it is difficult to make any prediction  about which
pricing rule (and associated  investment  rule) will produce the earlier
investment.  On the  one  hand,  the  fact  that  prices  do  not rise  with  capacity
utilization  means that long-run  marginal  cost pricing cannot  delay the
increase  in costs associated  with production  above design  capacity,  and
this  increases  the  benefit  of earlier  investment.  On the  other  hand,  long-
run marginal cost pricing does not allow the full exploitation  of the
additional  capacity  that  has  been installed,  and this  reduces  the  value  of
earlier investment. One can only conclude that the outcome of these
conflicting  tendencies  will depend  on the  circumstances  of each  particular
case.- 13 -
SECTION  3:  FISCAL  AND  FINANCIAL  OBJECTIVES
3.1  This section  addresses  the  main concern  of the  paper:  the  way in
which public sector prices should be modified to take account of the
government's  fiscal  constraint.  In discussing  this issue,  it is necessary
to consider the financial  constraints  that are often imposed  on public
enterprises. These financial constraints  typically  specify  requirements
such  as the  need  to reach  certain  rates  of return  on investment  or the  need
for the ente-prise  to break  even.  Although  part of their  justification  is
the need to provide  management  with simple  efficiency  objectives,  it is
clear that a major part of their justification  is to ensure that the
enterprises  do  not  constitute  a drain  on the  government's  fiscal  resources.
In any event,  they certainly  have an effect  on the government's  fiscal
positious.
3.2  The  section will  therefore  start  with  an analysis of the
relationship  between  the government's  fiscal  constraint  and the financial
objectives  that are set for individual  enterprises.  Once that has been
clarified,  the discussion  will proceed  by looking  in turn at the revenue
effects, the distortionary  effects and the distributional  effects of
pricing  above  marginal  cost.  The  relative  advantages  of taxation  and  higher
producer prices are then considered,  and the section finishes  with a
discussion  of the data  requirements  for  deciding  on revenue-raising  public
sector  prices.
A.  The  RelationshiD  Between  Fiscal  and  Financial  Objectives
3.3  In order  to clarify  the  relationship  between  fiscal  and  financial
constraints,  it is best to start  by considering  the government's  fiscal
constraint  on its  own and imagine  an economy  where  public  enterprises  do
not  face  financial  constraints,  but  carry  out  direct  government- 14 -
instructions.  If the government  was able to levy commodity  taxes  on all
transactions  in the domestic  economy,  the situation  would be the same as
that analyzed  by Diamond  and Mirrlees (1971).  They show that production
efficiency  is desirable,  provided  all  commodity  taxes  are  set  optimally  and
there are no after-tax  private  sector  profits.  They also show that the
pattern  of commodity  taxation  should  depend  on own-price  and cross-price
elasticities of demand for all the goods, in a manner that will be
discussed  more fully  below.
3.4  These  results have important implications for public sector
pricing. The production efficiency  result implies that trades between
firms,  including  those involving  public  sector  firms,  should  be priced  at
marvins.l  cost. This provides  a clear rationale  for the idea that public
enterprises  should price at marginal  cost, at least in their sales to
firms,  even  if the  government  faces  fiscal  constraints.
3.5  The commodity  tax  rules  derived  by Diamond  and  Mirrlees  relate  to
the difference  between  the  price  consumers  pay for the good (the  consumer
price)  and  its marginal  cost  of production.  Therefore,  if public
enterprises  did increase the pre-tax price (producer  price) of their
products  there  would  be no reason  for the  consumer  price  to  be raised:  the
nominal  tax  rate (the  difference  between  the  consumer  and  producer  prices)
should  be reduced  to keep the consumer  price  constant.  This implies  that,
as far as sales to consumers  are concerned,  the producer  price has no
allocative  role when commodity  taxes are optimally  set. The role of the
produceL  price  in making  investment  decisions  is  discussed  towards  the  end
of this  section,  but it can  be noted  here that setting  the  producer  price
equal to marginal  cost has the advantage  of avoiding  the need for the
enterprise  to  price  discriminate  between  firms  and  consumers:  that  task  can
be left  to  the  tax  authorities.- 15  -
3.6  The analysis presumes that any public  enterprise  profits  will
accrue  as revenue  to the  government,  and  that  any  public  enterprise  losses
will  be financed  from  general  revenue.  In the  context  of this  model,  there
is no reason  why any  particular  public  enterprise,  or the  public  sector  as
a whole,  should  break even.  Nonetheless,  the  widespread  use of break-even
targets  means that it is worth  considering  the  effect  of introducing  such
targets  for enterprises  that would make a loss when pricing  at marginal
cost. Such a move would force the affected  enterprises  to raise their
prices  above  marginal  cost. If they  only raised  their  prices  to consumers
and kept their  prices  to firms  at marginal  cost,  all that  would  happen  is
that the producer price would rise and (continuing  to assume optimal
taxation)  the  nominal  tax  would fall  so that the consumer  price  would  be
unchanged.  The enterprise  would  have eliminated  its  loss,  but only at the
expense  of tax  receipts.  Therefore,  there  has  been  ao allocative  change  and
the government  is no better  off than before.  On the other  hand, if the
enterprise  raised  prices  to firms,  this  would  yield  some  additional  revenue
to the  government  but at the  cost  of distorting  production  efficiency.  The
Diamond-Mirrlees  result implies that the extra revenue  could have been
raised  more efficiently  by increasing  the  general  level  of commodity  taxes.
3.7  This analysis  shows that,  under optimal  commodity  taxation,  the
imposition  of financial  targets  for enterprises  has either  no effect  or
reduces the efficiency of tax collection.  However, the assumption of
optimal  commodity  taxation  is  extremely  unrealistic  for  LDCs  and it  is  best
to regard  this analysis  as a clarification  of the  basic issues,  which is
necessary  before  analyzing  the  more  realistic  case  of  non-optimal  taxation.
3.8  Many LDCs raise a very small proportion  of their revenue from
domestic  commodity  taxes,  often relying  heavily  on import  duties.  Import
duties  that are levied  on goods  not produced  domestically  are similar  to- 16 -
commodity  taxes but  are  of limited coverage, and  are therefore no
substitute  for a full domestic  commodity  tax system.  One reason  for the
lack of comprehensive  commodity  taxes is the difficulty  of administration
and it is in this respect  that  public  sector  pricing,  with its relative
ease  of administration,  is  seen  as an  attractive  method  of raising  revenue.
3.9  With this  background,  it is probably  appropriate  to consider  the
effects  of introducing  financial  constraints  on the  assumption  that  the  tax
system,  including  any  taxes  that  are  levied  on the  publicly  produced  goods,
will not change in response to any price changes. In this case, the
imposition  of  a break-even  constraint on a previously  loss-making
enterprise  will produce  an increase  in the  producer  price  and the  consumer
price in sales to consumers. It may also increase  the price that the
enterprise  charges  to firms,  but the  most important  issues  can  be analyzed
by concentrating  on the  sales  to  consumers.
3.10  The increase  in the consumer  price is essentially  the same as a
tax increase  because  the extra  revenue  to the firw  will  be used to reduce
the government  subsidy,  the  net effect  being  a transfer  from  consumers  to
the government.  The  effect  of the  price  increase  on government  revenue  can
be divided  into two parts: (i)  the revenue  collected  on the good itself;
(ii) the effect  on revenue  elsewhere  in the economy.  Part (i) is clear
enough,  and obviously  depends  partly  on the elasticity  of demand  for the
good. Part (ii) arises because consumers  will alter their consumption
patterns in response  to the price change.  These changes in consumption
patterns  will  affect  the  demand  for  taxed  goods  and  goods  produced  by other
public  enterprises  that  price  above  marginal  cost.  These  changes  in  demand
will therefore  affect  government  revenue,  the magnitude  depending  on the
levels  of other  taxes  and  the  size  of cross-price  elasticities.- 17 -
3.11  In general  there is no guarantee  that part (ii) of the revenue
effect is positive. Also, if there is already a tax on the good in
question,  part (i)  could  be negative.  It is therefore  possible  to imagine  a
situation  where  the  imposition  of a  break-even  target  can  reduce  government
revenue.  Although  it might  be argued  that  such situations  are  unlikely  to
arise  in  practice,  they  are simply  extreme  examples  of the inefficiency  of
using financial targets to raise government revenue. In less extreme
circumstances,  where the total revenue gain from increased prices is
positive,  it will typically  be the  case that  the ratio  of revenue  gain  to
consumer  welfare  loss will be different  for different  goods. It is most
efficient  to increase  revenue  by raising  the  prices  of goods  for  which  this
ratio is highest. The  specification  of break-even targets, or other
financial  target,  for  individual  enterprises  will  only achieve  this  aim  by
pure chance.  Additional  government  revenue  from  public  enterprise  pricing
would  be raised  more efficiently  if some  agency  of the government  compared
the  costs  and  benefits  of alternative  price  rises  to  determine  which  public
enterprises should have  the largest differentials between price and
marginal  cost.  These  price differentials  could  then  be imposed  by setting
financial  targets,  if that  was the  most appropriate  enforcement  mechanism
or if there  were managerial  reasons  for imposing  targets.  However,  the
targets  would  be different  for  different  enterprises:  some  might  be allowed
to make a limited  loss,  while  others  may  be required  to  make a substantial
profit.
3.12  This argument implies that financial targets should be the
consequence  of public sector  pricing  decisions.  A result  that conflicts
with the common  practice  of using  such  financial  targets  to work out what
t:ie  prices  should  be.- 18 -
3.13  The  analysis so far has implicitly  assumed that each public
enterprise  produces  only one good,  so that the imposition  of a financial
target  will  determine  the  single  price.  If  an enterprise  produces  more  than
one  good,  the  financial  target does  not  completely  constrain the
enterprise's  pricing choice. It can decide  the relative  prices  of its
products. The literature  on this choice is summarized  in Atkinson  and
Stiglitz  (1980;  section  15-2).  The standard  idea is that the enterprise
attempts to meet its financial  target  at the least cost to consumers.
Despite the obvious  appeal  of this approach,  it is not optimal  for the
economy  as a whole because  each enterprise  will not take account  of the
effect  that its  pricing  decisions  have on the  revenue  of other  firms  or on
general  tax  revenue.  They  will  therefore  not  produce  the  prices  that  would
have been chosen  by a central  agency  that was concerned  with raising  a
given  total  of government  revenue  at least  cost  to consumers.
3.14  This problem is separate from the issue of the level of the
financial  targets,  and  continues  to  apply  even if  the  financial  targets  are
set  optimally.  It therefore  provides  a general  argument  against  the  use of
financial  targets  if the  enterprises  can choose  their  own  prices.  However,
financial targets can be of great practical importance in providing
incentives  to enterprises  to improve  efficiency  and  enforce  the  payments  of
charges. Also, any central agency would have difficulty in obtaining
sufficient  data to choose  the relative  prices  of the products  of multi-
product  enterprises.  The argument  against  setting  aniy  financial  target  is
therefore  less  persuasive  than  the  main  argument  of this  section:  that  the
financial  targets  set for  an enterprise  should  be determined  by the  price
it should  charge,  not  the  other  way round.- 19  -
B.  Fiscal  Gains  From  Pricing  Above  Marginal  Cost
3.15  The  discussion  above  showed that the  simple imposition of
financial  constraints  on enterprises  is  not a good  method  of improving  the
fiscal  position  of the central  government.  The alternative  is to choose
public  sector  prices  in a  manner  which  takes  account  of the  full  effects  of
pricirng  on government  revenue.  It is therefore  necessary,  at this  point,  to
look at these  revenue  effects  in more detail.  We will concentrate  on the
case  where it is only the price  to final  consumers  that is being raised.
The effects  of pricing  above  marginal  cost to firms  will be considered  in
more  detail  later.
3.16  In general, the increase  in a public sector  price will affect
supply  and demand  throughout  the economy  and thus alter all prices. It
would  be a major task to trace  out and quantify  these  effects,  and would
probably require the construction  of a computable general equilibrium
model. However,  the most important  revenue  consequences  can be analyzed
using a simplified  model where prices in the rest of the economy are
assumed  to  be  unaffected. 4 In  this  case,  the  effects  of  a  public  sector
price  increase  are  limited  to  alterations  in  the  pattern  of  demand.
3.17  If  we assume  that  the  profits  and  losses  of public  enterprises  are
simply  passed  on to the central  government  (there  iS  no form of profit-
sharing  within the enterprise),  the difference  betwee.i  marginal  cost and
consumer price has the same effect on government ftnances  and on the
4/  Strictly,  this  constancy  of other  prices  requires very  strong
assumptions. The best known set of sufficient  conditions  are those
required  for  the  Non-substitution  Theorem: constant  returns  to scale,
one non-produced  factor  of production  and no joint production.  The
most objectionable  of these  assumptions  is  probably  that  there  is  only
one  non-produced  factor  of production.  Heady  and  Mitra  (1982)  show  how
this  assumption  can  be relaxed  in the  study  of commodity  taxation,  and
similar  techniques  could  be used  here.- 20 -
pattern  of  consumer  demand  as  a  tax:  the  difference  is  purely
administrative.  It is  therefore  convenient  to regard  them  as taxes.
3.18  If there  are  n goods,  the  tax  revenue  of the  government  minus  the
losses  of  public  sector  enterprises  is  given  by:
n
R  - ti  Xi  -Loss
i-i
where  R is  government  revenue  available  for  other  uses,
ti  is  the  tax  on good  i expressed  in absolute  (rather  than
proportionate)  terms,
Xi  is  the  total  consumer  demand  for  good  i,
Loss  is  the  aggregate  net loss  of  public  enterprises  excluding
the  revenue  from  pricing  above  marginal  cost.
3.19  If we now consider  an increase  in the  price of good 1, this  has
the effect  of increasing  the  implicit  taxation,  t, and the  consumer  price,
q, of that good.  It should  be noted  that as "Loss"  is worked  out on the
basis that enterprises  only  receive  their  marginal  cost,  small  changes  in
demand  will not  affect  its  magnitude.  The derivative  of government  revenue
(net  of  public  sector  losses)  can  therefore  be written  as:
6R  n  1 t6x+t~ ER  X1 + tj  6Xl + E  ti -X
6tl 6ql  i-2  6ql
where  6  is the  symbol  for  partial  differentiation.
3.20  The first  term in this expression represents the additional
revenue  that  would  accrue  from  a price  rise if there  was  no alteration  in
the  pattern  of demand.  The second  and third  terms  represent  the  effects  on- 21 -
revenue  that follow  from  the  changes  in  demand.  The second  term  represents
the  change  in revenue  from  the  existing  (explicit  or implicit)  tax  on good
1 that  follows  from  the  price  increase.  This  will  be negative  (unless  it is
a Giffen  good),  and could  outweigh  the first  term if either  the existing
tax  was  very large  and/or  the  own-price  elasticity  of demand  was large.  The
sign and magnitude  of the third term will depend  both on the existing
pattern  of taxation  and  the  pattern  of  cross-price  elasticities.
3.21  Consideration  of this  expression  should  clarify  some  of the  claims
made in the  analysis  of financial  constraints.  First,  if  we assume  that  the
third  term is  zero (demands  are independent),  it is clear  that  the  revenue
raising possibilities of taxes on goods depends on  their own-price
elasttcity  of demand,  a fact  that  will not  be reflected  in the imposition
of uniform  break-even  targets. 5 Second,  if demands  are  not independent,
the non-zero third term indicates  that raising  prices on one good can
affect  the revenue  elsewhere.  This would  not  be taken  into account  by an
individual  enterprise solely concerned  with meeting its own financial
target.
C.  The  Distortionary  Cost  of Pricing  Above  Marginal  Cost
3.22  Government  revenue raising usually involves  some distortionary
cost,  and the problem  of designing  an efficient  system  of revenue  raising
involves  a minimization  of these  costs.  It is therefore  necessary  to spell
out the  distortionary  cost  of using  public  sector  prices  to raise  revenue.
However,  it is worth  noting  that  not all taxes  on publicly  provided  goods
are distortionary  if an externality  is involved  in their  use. In such a
5/  These  differences  in revenue  raising  capability  will continue  to apply
even if the assumption of  independent demands is dropped:  the
differences  will  just  be more  difficult  to evaluate.- 22  -
case,  there  is  no conflict  berween  efficiency  and  revenue  raising  up to the
point where the optimal externality-correcting  tax is levied. 6 The
analysis  here considers  the distortionary  costs  of raising  charges  above
that level.  For reasons  of exposition,  we start  by supposing  that only
prices  to consumers  are raised  above  marginal  cost.  The distortionary  cost
of raising  prices  to firms  will  be considered  afterwards.
3.23  The distortion  involved  in pricing  a publicly  produced  good  above
its  marginal  cost is the same as that generated  by a tax: it discourages
consumption  of that  good  and encourages  consumers  to  buy other  goods  which
are less efficient (in terms of resources)  at meeting the consumers'
requirements.  This change in consumption  patterns  is not a cost to the
consumer.  Indeed,  it can  be regarded  as an attempt  by consumers  to  mitigate
their  loss  from  the  price  increase.  However,  it  is a  cost  to the  government
because  the  shift  in  cons?umption  is  away  from  the  good  that  is  being  taxed.
The distortionary  cost  of a public  sector  price increase  is therefore  the
loss  in  government  revenue  that results from the induced change in
consumption  patterns.
3.24  More formally,  the cost to consumers  of a small increase  in the
price  of, say, good 1 is the  quantity  of the good  consumed  multiplied  by
the size of the price  increase. In other words, the derivative of
consumers' costs with respect  to the price of good 1 is given by the
quantity of good 1 consumed.  This can be compared  with the expression
derived  above  for  the  derivative  of government  revenue,  and it can  be seen
that the difference  between  the consumers'  loss  and the government's  gain
is  given  by the  last  two  terms,  representing  the  effect  of the  price  change
6/  An important  example  of such externalities  arises  in road transport,
and Section  4 discusses  the level  at which  road  use charges  should  be
set.- 23  -
on the  revenue  from  existing  taxes.  Thus.the  distortionary  cost (or  "excess
burden") of public sector pricing arises from changes in consumption
patterns:
Distortionary  cost 7
E  ti  *  .
i-1  6qi
3.25  It  will  not always  be the  case that  the  marginal  excess  burden  of
a  price  change  will  be positive.  It  could  be negative  if  there  is  already  a
substantial  tax  on a good  that is  a substitute  for  the  good  whose  price  is
being  increased.  The  reason  for  this  is that  the  price  rise  will reduce  the
distortion  in prices  between the two substitutes,  an effect  that might
outweigh  other  distortions  produced  by raising  the  price.  However,  so long
as the (more  conventional)  second  measure  of excess  burden  is concerned,
the  total  excess  burden  (obtained  by integrating  the  marginal  distortionary
costs)  will  always  be non-negative.
7/  This expression  for the  marginal  distortionary  cost of an increase  in
the  price  of good  1 is  slightly  different  from  the  standard  one.  This
is because it is common  practice  to look not at the cost of a tax
increase,  but to coi.pare  the  effect  of the  distortionary  tax increase
with that of a  lump sum tax that has the same effect  on consumer
welfare.  A lump-sum  tax  will have income  effects  on the revenue  from
existing  taxes,  and  so the  extra  cost  of  using  public  sector  pricing  is
given  by the substitution  effects  alone.  Thus, the marginal  excess
burden  of  raising  the  price  of good  1 is:
- E ti.Sil
where Sil is the compensated  derivative  of demand  for good i with
respect  to  the  price  of good  1.
It should  be noted  that  the  choice  of  which  measure  to  use in comparing
alternative  price  changes  will not affect  the  outcome,  as comparisons
will typically  be between  changes  that  yield  similar  revenues  and  have
similar  effects  on consumer  welfare.  Thus the income  effects  will  be
the same and the ordering  by one  measure  will be the same as that  by
the  other.- 24 -
3.26  Turning  now to the  issue  of the  distortions  produced  by increasing
prices  to firms  above  marginal  cost,  it  is  necessary  to drop  the  assumption
that  taxes  do not affect  prices  elsewhere  in the economy  because  a tax  on
an intermediate  good  will inevitably  alter  the  prices  of either  the  final
outputs  or some  other  inputs.  The  simplest  assumption  is to  assume  that  the
prices  of factors  are fixed,  that there  are  constant  returns  to scale  and
that all taxes  on intermediate  goods  are shifted  forwards  onto the final
consumer  goods.  In this case a tax (or  price  atove  marginal  cost)  on an
intermediate  good  will raise  the  price  of the  final  consumer  goods  that  use
it as a direct  or indirect  input.  The rise in the  price of each consumer
good  will equal  the  rise  in the input  price  multiplied  by the  share  of the
input  in the  cost  of producing  the  consumer  good.
3.27  The  increase  in  the  price  of each  consumer  good  as a result  of the
input  price  rise  is similar  to a  direct  tax  on the  consumer  good:  it  raises
the  price above its  social  marginal  cost  and the revenue  from it goes to
the government (as the revenue from the input price rise). Thus the
distortionary  effects  can  be analyzed  in just the  same  way as the  consumer
price  rises  ab.ve.  However,  the increase  in the  price  of the intermediate
good  has another  effect:  it  distorts  the  choice  of technique  by firms  that
use it  or goods  produced  with it.  The  importance  of this  distortion  depends
on the extent of substitution  possibilities  within production,  but the
important  point  to note is that  this  is an additional  distortion  which  has
no corresponding  additional  revenue  gains.  It is tnerefore  more efficient
to  raise  revenue  by directly  taxing  the  goods  produced  with the  help  of the
intermediate  good than by taxing the intermediate  good itself:  both
policies  distort  consumer  choice,  but only the second  distorts  producer
choice. It is this point that lies behind  the recommendation  of Newbery- 25  -
(1986)  to avoid  revenue  raising  taxation  of freight  transport  unless  it  is
impossible  to directly  tax  the  final  products. 8
3.28  This  qualification  is  very important  in  many countries  because  of
the  difficulty  of levying  commodity  taxes  on  domestically  produced  consumer
goods.  There are circumstances  where the taxation  of intermediate  goods
(such  as freight  transport)  is desirable  in the light  of an inability  to
directly  tax the final  outputs. 9 One difficulty  of taxing  intermediate
goods  is that it could  discourage  the taxation  of final  products,  because
then they would be subjecr  to double  taxation.  However,  this difficulty
could  be avoided  by allowing  firms  to claim  back the  taxes  on their  inputs
if they  paid tax on their  sales,  a system  that  amounts  to a partial  Value
Added  Tax.
3.29  This is unrealistic  to assume  complete  forward  shifting  of taxes
on intermediate  goods if some of the final products  are internationally
traded.  Some of the taxation  will be passed  backwards  onto factors,  and
Hughes  (1986)  reports  on the  use  of an input-output  table  to calculate  the
effects.  However, the alternative  assumptions  used in this case do not
alter  the  basic  argument  against  the  taxation  of  intermediate  goods.  The
new  feature  of  this  case  is  that  intermediate  good  taxation  acts  like  a
factor  tax  as  well  as  a  commodity  tax,  but  there  is  still  the  additional
production  distortion.  The same  tax revenue  can  be levied  more efficiently
by implementing  the commodity and factor taxes directly, rather than
through  the  taxation  of  intermediate goods.  Thus  revenue-raising
8/  The question  of whether  to tax  a particular  input  into  production  when
thcre  is already  production  inefficiency  dae to other input  taxes is
discussed  in  Section  4  below.
9/  This  problem  is  analyzed  in  Feldstein  (1972c).- 26 -
intermediate  good taxation  is only desirable  if direct  taxation  of its
products  (or  the  factors  which  bear the  incidence  of the  tax) is desirable
but administratively  infeasible.
D.  Distributional  Effects  of Pricing  Above  Marginal  Cost
3.30  The analysis  of the  revenue  raising  and distortionary  effects  of
pricing  above  marginal  cost  are sufficient  for the  design  of public  sector
pricing  policy  if income  distribution  is ignored: prices  should  be raised
on those goods with a high ratio of marginal  revenue  gain to marginal
distortionary  costs,  and lowered  for those  where that ratio is low.  The
choice  of dividing  line between  high and low ratios  will depend  on the
government's  need for revenue.  Prices  will be optimal  when the ratio  of
marginal  gain to marginal  loss is the same  for all goods. 10 If demands
are independent,  this leads to the well-known rule that the ratio of
consumer  price  to  producer  price  (one  plus  the  implicit  tax  rate)  should  be
inversely  proportional  to the  own-price  elasticity  of  demand. 11
3.31  However,  public  sector  products  often include  goods  whose  prices
are politically sensitive, often for distributional reasons. It is
therefore  necessary  to consider  the  distributional  consequences  of pricing
above  marginal  cost. 12 ,13 First,  of course,  it  is  necessary  to  be able  to
10/  This policy  leads to 'Ramsey  pricing",  the relation  of which to the
original  paper  on taxation,  Ramsey  (1927),  is  explained  by B6s (1985).
11/  There are in fact two rules  here.  If it is the compensated  demands
that  are independent,  taxes  (or  the  proportional  mark-up  of price  over
marginal cost) should be inversely  proportional  to the compensated
elasticities  of demand.  If it is the uncompensated (Marshallian)
demands  that  are independent,  taxes  should  be inversely  proportional  to
the  uncompensated  elasticities  of demand.
12/  This  preblem  was first  analyzed  by Feldstein  (1972a).
13/  We will ignore  here the  attempts  that  are sometimes  used to ameliorate
the  distributional  effects  of  high  prices  by using  a differential  price
system  that  benefits  poorer  consumers.- 27 -
describe  the distributional  effects  of price increases.  This is straight
forward  for  prices  to  consumers  provided  there  is some  data  on consumption
patterns  at different  income  levels.  The distributional  effects  of prices
to firms  would  require  the  techniques  referred  to above  in  order  to  predict
their  effect  on consumer  goods  and  factor  prices.
3.32  Once the distributional  effect  of the price increase  has been
described, the situation is no longer  one of balancing  a revenue  gain
against  an homogeneous  consumer  loss.  Instead,  the loss involves  a series
of losses  to households  at different  points  in the income  distribution.  A
concern  for income  distribution  implies  that  more  weight  should  be applied
to losses  that  fall  on low  income  households.  Thus the  cost  of the  revenue
equals  the  weighted  sum of individual  household  losses,  where the  weights
decline  with  household  income.  It is then  the  ratio  of the  revenue  gain  to
this weighted loss that should  determine  whether  a public sector  price
should  be raised  or lowered. 14
3.33  This use of distributional  weights  can  also deal with situations
where the public  sector  is selling  output  to foreigners,  as is often  the
case  with  ports.  The  weight  put  on losses  to  foreigners  could  well  be zero,
unless  there  was some  special  reason  for  taking  account  of their  welfare.
E.  The  Choice  Between  Taxes  and  Higher  Prices  for  EnterDrises
3.34  In discussing  the question  of pricing  to consumers,  the question
of whether  it is  raised  by using  a tax  or by increasing  the  producer  price
that the firm receives  has been regarded  as an administrative  issue.  This
is because we have been mainly concerned  with the effects on consumer
demand and government  revenue. However, the increase in a price also
14/  This is the technique  used by Ahmad and Stern (1987)  in comparing
alternative  sources  of tax  revenue.- 28 -
affects  the enterprises  producing  goods  and it is to that issue  that the
analysis  now turns. In particular,  should  the price to the consumer  be
raised  by increasing  the  producer  price  so that  the  firm's  profits  rise,  or
should  it  be raised  by a tax  so that  the  firm's  profits  are  unaffected  and
the  money  goes  straight  to the  central  government?
3.35  To  a  certain extent,  the answer  to this  question  is  the
administrative  one of which is the easier  system  to operate  and which is
less likely  to suffer  from fraud.  There is also the  potential  problem  of
firms spending  some of their increased  profitability  on higher  wages or
fringe  benefits.  These  issues  depend  on administrative  arrangements  and  are
outside  the  scope  of this  paper.  The interest  here is in the  effect  of the
alternative  systems  on output  and  investment  decisions.
3.36  With a given  capital  stock,  output  will  be the same  under  the two
systems because they produce the same wedge between marginal  cost and
consumer  price.  Marginal  cost  depends  only on output  in the  short  run,  and
so output  is determined  at the  level  where  the  inflated  marginal  cost  curve
intersects  the market demand curve. In other words, the pricing rule
determines  output.
3.37  However,  investment  might reduce  marginal  costs and so provides
the  enterprise  with some  freedom.  If  pricing  is  based  on short-rvit  marginal
cost (plus  a revenue  raising  mark-up),  new investment  will lower  the  price
and increase  output.  This  will  be more attractive  to the  firm  if the  price
increase  was in the form of a high producer  price than if it was in the
form  of taxation. 15
15/  On the one hand, if pricing was based on long-run marginal  cost,
investment  would  have little  if any effect  on price,  and  hence  demand
and  profit.  However,  Section  1 came to the  conclusion  that short-run
marginal  cost  should  form  at least  pert  of the  pricing  rule  and  so this
exception  should  have little  practical  importance.- 29 -
3.38  The extra investment  encouraged  by raising  producer  prices  under
short-run  marginal  cost pricing is undesirable  because it represents  an
attempt to undercut  the price that was set by comparing  the costs and
benefits  of alternative  price  changes.  Thus,  although  it raises  additional
profits for the enterprise concerned, it will be harming the revenue
raising  abilities  of other  taxes  and public  enterprises.  In this  case, it
is therefore  better  to use taxes,  or else to have government  control  of
investment  decisions  in  order  to  prevent  excessive  investment.
F.  Data  Reauirements
3.39  In considering  the data requirements  for calculating  how far
public sector  prices  should  differ  from  marginal  cost, it is easiest  to
think  first about the requirements  for the simplest  adjustments  and then
consider  the  additional  data  for  more complex  cases.
3.40  The simplest  case is  when it is only  sales  to consumers  that  will
be priced  above  marginal  cost,  and there  is no concern  for the effect  of
pricing on the distribution  of income.  The distortionary  cost estimates
require  information  on taxes  (and  the  extent  of pricing  above  marginal  cost
in public enterprises)  and estimates of a demand system, in order to
predict  the  effect  of price  changes  on the  revenue  from  existing  taxes.
3.41  It is tempting  to assume  independent  demands  (either  compensated
or uncompensated)  because  of the  reduction  in  the  number  of  parameters  that
have to  be estimated.  However,  it is  impossible  for  all  compensated  demands
to be independent  (the theoretical  tax literature  usually assumes the
existence  of an untaxed  good which  absorbs  all the  substitution  effects),
and  uncompensated  demands  can  only  all  be independent  if all the  own-price
elasticities  of demand are unity. Also, it is clear that substitution
between different  goods  within a category (fuel  or transport)  can have
important  revenue  effects.  At the  very  least,  it  is  possible  to  use an  own-- 30 -
price elasticity  (together  with the budget constraint)  to work out the
effect  of a price  change  on the  total  demand  for  all  other  goods  and  then
to multiply that effect  by the average  tax rate on all other goods to
obtain  an approximate  revenue  effect  from  substitution  into  other  goods.  In
many cases  it  will be possible  to do  better  than  this  and  obtain  estimates
(perhaps  from other countries)  of how the increased  expenditure  on all
other  goods  will  be divided  between  important  categories  of goods.
3.42  Moving  to  the  pricing  of sales  to  firms,  an  analysis  of the  fiscal
and distortionary  effects  requires  the use of the technique  described  by
Newbery  and mentioned  above to calculate  the effects  of intermediate  good
prices on factor  and consumer  goods prices.  This technique  requires  an
input-output  table and a knowledge of which goods are internationally
traded. This technique  allows the calculation  of the effects on factor
price  and consumer  prices,  and their  fiscal  and distortionary  effects  can
be calculated usit,,  the data discussed  above.  However,  the pricing of
intermediate  goods  above  marginal  cost also  has a distortionary  effect  on
production  (measured  as the revenue  lost by substitution  away from taxed
inputs),  which can only be estimated  with some knowledge  of substitution
possibilities in the relevant industries.  This may well be the most
difficult  data  to  obtain.
3.43  The introduction  of distributional  considerations  is the final
complication  to be introduced.  This requires  a household  budget  survey  in
order to allocate  the losses  from price increases  between  households  on
different  income  levels. The  distributional weights are  the other
requirement,  but these come from the government's  objectives  rather  than
empirical  data.- 31 -
SECTION  4:  METERING  PROBLENS
4.1  The  analysis  in the  paper  so far  has assumed  that  the  consumption
of goods can be observed,  so that charges  can be made for them.  As the
time at which goods are consumed  is sometimes  of considerable  economic
significance  (for  example,  road  use at peak times  has  different  costs  from
road  use  at off-peak  times),  this  assumption  implies  that,  for  those  goods,
the  timing  of consumption  can  also  be observed  and  included  in  the  charging
formula.  Similarly,  location  of road  use (rural  versus  urban,  for  example)
can be important and different charges should  be made for the use of
different roads. In practice, it is difficult to undertake all the
observations  required  to implement  such optimal  policies  and so pricing
policy  must  reflect  the  metering  difficulties  involved.
4.2  This section  considers  how pricing  policy should  be adapted  to
take account  of metering  difficulties.  In order to bring the discussion
into focus, the analysis will be conducted in terms of the specific
metering problems involved in levying road user charges.  However,  the
principles involved will be  the same for other goods with metering
problems.
4.3  The  discussion  in  this  section  will  be kept  at an intuitive  level,
while the formal  derivations  of results  are shown in the appendix.  The
formal  models  disregard  revenue-raising  considerations  in order  to clarify
the implications  of metering  problems.  However,  the discussion  of these
results in this section will include considerations  of revenue where
appropriate.
4.4  In the absence of metering  difficulties,  road users should  be
charged  for the externalities  involved  in additional  road use:  damage  to
the road, pollution  and extra congestion.  Model 1 in the appendix  shows- 32 -
that the charges  for road use should  equal the marginal  external  costs.
However,  it is often  impractical to make such charges, for reasons
discussed  below,  and  other  approaches  must  be used.
4.5  The  discussion  will center  around  two  related  but distinct  aspects
of metering  difficulties.  The first  is the difficulty  of taxing  different
road  uses  at different  rates.  The  second  is  the  possible  need  to charge  for
road  use indirectly,  via taxes  on inputs  such  as fuel.
A.  Charging  for  Different  Uses
4.6  Walters  (1968)  argued  for the  charging  of different  road  uses at
different  rates  because  of differences  in the  marginal  cost,  particularly
congestion costs, of road use in different  locations  and at different
times.  However,  this  recommendation  has  not  been  widely  implemented.  One  of
the reasons for this is the practical difficulty of measuring each
vehicle's  use of different  types of road at different  times  of day. In
part, this difficulty  arises  from the costs  of measuring  total road use
directly,  so that charges  are often  made indirectly  on the more easily
measurable inputs such as fuel. The issues that arise from indirect
charging  are addressed  more fully  below,  but in the  current  context  it is
clear that a fuel tax cannot  discriminate  between the use of different
roads  at different  times  of day.  However,  even if total  road  use  could  be
measured  reliably,  there  would remain  the problem  of charging  separately
for different  uses. Time of day could  be incorporated  relatively  easily
into a tachometer  based system,  but the  metering  of which roads  are used
involves  more severe technical  difficulties  and can be perceived  as an
invasion  of personal  privacy.
4.7  In these circumstances,  it is necessary  to consider  how to set
road use charges if they are constrained  to be uniform  across  time and
location.  Model 4 in the appendix  addresses  this issue  by considering  the- 33 -
case  where  two  different  uses  must  be taxed  at the  same  rate.  The  analysis
can  readily  be generalized  to  more than  two  uses.
4.8  The essence  of the situation  is that the raising  of the  uniform
tax on all road uses will reduce each type of road use by an amount
dependant  on the demand  elasticity  for that type of road  use. The demand
elasticities  are  outside  the  control  of the  government,  which is therefore
unable  to control  the relative  size  of the  reductions.  This  means  that  the
government  can  only  control  a weighted  average  of the  road  uses,  where the
weights depend on consumer  preferences.  It therefore  sets the road use
charge  at a weighted  average  of the  road  use costs  from  each type  of road
use. The appendix  shows  that the correct  weights  in this average  are the
c3mpensated  derivatives  of each  road  use  with  respect  to the  uniform  tax.
4.9  This result is quite intuitive  and implies  that some road uses
will be over-charged,  while others  are  undercharged.  This means that the
constrained  pricing leaves some externalities  that have not been fully
internalized. This means that one should  consider  the effects  of other
prices  on the harm caused  by the externalities.  Thus, any good  which is
more of a  substitute  for the under-taxed  road uses than over-taxed  uses
should  have its  price  reduced  to  discourage  those  uses.  Similarly,  any  good
that is more of a substitute  for over-taxed  uses should  have its price
increased.  This rule  would  be very  hard to apply  for  all gdods  because  of
data limitations,  but it might be possible  to establish  whether public
transport  is more of a substitute  for (under-taxed)  peak traffic  than for
(over-taxed)  off-peak  traffic.
4.10  The introduction  of fiscal  considerations  does  little  to  alter  the
situation.  From the  point  of  view  of the  tax  authorities,  the  road  uses  can
be viewed as one aggregate  good and the fiscal  adjustment  to the charge
derived  in the  appendix  can  be determined  using  the  techniques  described  in- 34 -
Section  3. However,  it must be remembered  that  much of road use involves
freight,  which is an intermediate  good,  and thus  requires  more complicated
procedures  for  the  evaluation  of  both fiscal  and  distortionary  effects.  The
taxation  of personal  private  transport,  on the  other  hand,  can  be analyzed
in  the  same  way as  any  consumption  good.
B.  The  Use of Indirect  Charges
4.11  As explained  above, the difficulties  of directly  measuring  road
use often induce  governments  to tax it indirectly  through  inputs  such  as
fuel.  This  has the  effect  of  making  it  more  difficult  to tax  different  uses
at different  rates,  an issue  addressed  above.  Indirect  charging  also has
other  effects,  and it is  to these  that  we now  tura.
4.12  Model  2 in the  appendix  analyses  the  case  where  only  the  privately
purchased  inputs  into road use can be taxed,  and shows that the optimal
policy  is to tax all inputs  at a uniform  proportional  rate.  This has the
same  effect  as the  same proportional  tax  on road  use itself.  Therefore,  in
the context  of the model, there is nothing  lost by the use of indirect
charging.
4.13  It is important  to note that  the  taxation  of inputs  into  road  use
(such as diesel) in accordance  with the results of Model 2 does not
contradict  the  argument  against  input  taxation,  explained  in Section  3.  The
reason for this is that the argument of Section 3 was  in terms of
preventing  the distortion  of production  activities.  But the  taxes  obtained
in  Model  2  are  not  distortionary;  they  are  corrective  and  their  application
will therefore  improve  production  efficiency.
4.14  A further  point in connection  with production  efficiency  is that
it is only achieved  if all inputs  are free of distortionary  taxation.  If
some other inputs are already  taxed (by sales taxes,  excise duties  or- 35 -
import  duties 16 ),  it may  be best to impose  taxes  on inputs  into  road  use,
in addition  to the corrective  taxes.  Model 5 in the appendix  derives  a
formula  for this additional  taxation,  which is a variant  of the  weighted
average  formula  derived  by Dixit  and  Newbery  (1985)  in the  case  where  there
is  no road  user  cost.  The  formal  derivation  in  the  appendix  is  conducted  in
terms of charging  for inputs  into personal  transport,  but the argument
applies  equally  well to the derived  demand  for transport  by firms.  The
formula  allows  a decomposition  of the overall  tax into a road use cost
component  and  a component  that  partially  corrects  for  other  distortions  in
the  economy.
4.15  The uniform  taxation  result  of Model  2 should  be interpreted  with
care even if there is no reason to apply the extra tax component  for
distortionary  taxation  of other  goods.  It assumes  that all inputs  can be
taxed  and it assumes  that the taxes  do not apply  to non-transport  uses  of
the input.  The first  assumption  would  be violated  for personal  transport
(and  perhaps  small-scale  commercial  transport)  as the input  of labor  cannot
usually be taxed. The second assumption is also violated  by the non-
transport  uses  of diesel,  which  cannot  effectively  be taxed  at a lower  rate
than  transport  uses  because  of the  difficulty  of preventing  resale  between
sectors.  This  point  is  discussed  by Newbery  (1986).
16/  Import  duties  should  be included  in the  definition  of taxes  even  if the
duties are used  to protect domestic industries,  such as vehicle
assembly. The reason  for  this  is that import  duties  are  equivalent  to
a sales tax and a production  subsidy.  It is the production  subsidy
that  is  protecting  domestic  industry, while  the  sale  tax  is
discouraging  consumption.- 36 -
4.16  The case where one of the inputs  cannot  be taxed is analyzed  in
the  Model  3 in the  appendix.  The tax  rate  on the  remaining  good 17 will then
depend.partly  on the  extent  to which it can influence  the consumption  of
the untaxed input. If it has no  (compensated)  effect, the tax on the
remaining  good  is simply  the  value  of its  marginal  contribution  to road  use
costs. If it reduces the consumption  of the other good, because the
reduction  in road use outweighs  any substitution  between the inputs,  the
tax  rate  will  be higher  to  reflect  this  extra  beneficial  effect.  If the  two
goods  are  used in  fixed  proportions,  the  tax  rate  on the  taxed  good  will  be
increased  to incorporate  the  entire  tax that  should  have  been paid  on the
untaxed good. In this case, the restriction  on taxation  has no harmful
effect:  in essence,  a tax on any input  can  be used to discourage  road  use
without  any  distortions  caused  by input  LAbstitution.
4.17  In  general,  one  would  expect  there  to  be some  substitution  between
inputs so that the non-taxability  of an input  will reduce the overall
charge  on road  use  and  leave  some  of the  road  use  externality  uncorrected.
4.18  Turning to the second assumption  that might be violated, the
existence  of "by-product"  distortions  caused  by the non-transport  use of
taxed  inputs  will lower  the  optimal  tax  on the input  concerned.  The  extent
by which it should  be lowered  will depend on the marginal  cost of the
distortions,  represented  by the  losses  of government  revenue  plus the  harm
of any adverse changes in income  distribution  (or minus the benefit of
favorable  changes).  This  case  is not  explicitly  modelled  in  the
appendix,but  its effect  on road  use charging  will  be similar  to that  of a
non-taxable input because it prevents the good from making its full
17/  This result  would  apply  to each  of the remaining  inputs  if there  were
more  than  one- 37 -
contribution  to the discouragement  of road  use. 18 Therefore,  as above,
the taxes on other  inputs will depend on the extent that they are
substitutes  with the input  whose  tax  is constrained.  Also,  as above,  there
will  be an externality  that  is  not  fully  internalized  and,  if  possible,  the
pricing on other goods should be adjusted to reduce the harm of this
distortion.
4.19  The introduction  of fiscal  considerations  with indirect  charges
introduces  no new issues  of principle,  even if the  charges  are restricted.
However,  it must be noted  that  many inputs  into  transport  are also inputs
into  other  production  processes,  and so the  evaluation  of both fiscal  and
distortionary  costs  are  made  more  complicated.
C.  Data  Requietments
4.20  The fundamental  data  requirement  for  setting  road  user  charges  are
the  marginal  road user cost for  different  vehicles  at different  places  at
different  times.  The introduction  of metering  problems,  however,  requires
data on the demand  characteristics  of both road use and its inputs.  The
need for  Aniform  charging  requires  data  on the  compensated  demand  responses
to changes  in the  charge,  while  restrictions  on indirect  charging  require
data on the complementarity  between different  inputs  into road use. In
addition,  the  consideration  of distortionary  taxes  elsewhere  in  the  economy
requires  data  on the  compensated  demand  responses  of taxed  goods  to changes
in  road  use charges.
4.21  It must be remembered  that  much of the demand  for road  use, and
other  taxed  goods,  come  from  firms.  The  effects  of charges  on their  derived
demands  for  inputs  are  therefore  as important  as the  effects  of charges  on
direct  consumer  demand.
18/  A similar  case  arises  if,  as suggested  by Newbery  (1986),  it is  thought
unwise to tax tires and spare parts heavily  because of the adverse
effects  on safety.- 38  -
SECTION  5:  SUMNARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
5.1  This paper has addressed  a number  of issues  connected  with the
setting of public  sector prices, paying particular attention to the
government's  need to raise  revenue  and the  special  problems  of charging  in
the transport sector. Conclusions  have been derived for the choice  of
marginal  cost concept,  for the setting  of revenue  raising  prices  and for
the  design  of  pricing  in  the  presence  of  metering  difficulties.
5.2  In considering  the  choice  between  long-run  and short-run  marginal
cost as a basis  for  pricing,  it  was shown  that the  argument  for  short-run
marginal  cost pricing  depended  on the ability  to alter  prices  when there
are changes  in capacity  utilization.  It is therefore  most appropriate  in
industries  where excess  capacity  will last for an appreciable  time.  The
argument for long-run marginal cost pricing centered on the need for
certainty  about future  prices  to guide  investment  decisions  and therefore
applied  to  cases  where  incorrect  investment  decisions  would  be very  costly.
It would be possible to use a  weighted average of long and short-run
marginal cost with the weights chosen  in each industry  to reflect the
relative  importance  of the  various  factors.
5.3  In considering  the relationship  between investment  policy and
pricing,  it was  shown  that differences only occur when  there are
indivisibilities  in investment.  Short-run  marginal  cost  pricing  produces  a
rore  efficient  use of investment,  but it is  impossible  to say  which  pricing
rule  will  generate  earlier  increases  in  capacity.
5.4  The consideration  of the fiscal  role  of public  sector  pricing  was
the major concern  of the paper.  It was shown  that the use of financial
targets for enterprises  produced pricing decisions that did not raise
revenue  efficiently  - in extreme  cases  they  could  even reduce  revenue.  It. 39  -
was therefore argued that prices should  be set on the basis of their
economy wide effect and financial constraints,  if any, should only be
imposed  in the light  of the  prices  set.  This  constitutes  a reversal  of a
common  situation,  where  financial  constraints  are imposed  first  and  prices
set in response  to those  constraints.  The final  conclusion  in relation  to
financial  constraints  was that, even if the, are set in response  to the
desirable  level  of prices,  the  enterprises  will  still  not  have  an incentive
to set  the  correct  structure  of prices  if  they  pioduce  more than  one  good.
5.5  The  remaining  results  on  revenue  raising  consist  of
recommendations  as to how  prices  should  be set  by taking  account  of their
revenue  raising  effect,  their  distortionary  effect  and their  distributional
effect.  It was shown  that the  prices  of intermediate  goods  should  only  be
set above marginal cost if it was administratively  impractical  to levy
taxes  on  the  goods  for  which  they  are  inputs.  The  pricing  of  consumer  goods
should  depend  on  both  the  own-price  elasticity  of demand  and the cross-
price  elasticities,  while  consideration  of  income  distribution  requires  a
weighting  of the  losses  that  fall  on  households  at different  ineome  levels.
As a special  case, if there  are no distributional  effects  and if cross-
elasticities  of demand  are zero,  the proportionate  mark-up  of price  over
marginal  cost should  be inversely  proportional  to the  own-price  elasticity
of demand.
5.6  A consideration  of investment  behavior  showed  how  enterprises  that
based their  prices  on short-run  marginal  cost might  be encouraged  to over
invest  in  new  capacity  if  they  received  the  higher  prices  that  are  required
to raise  revenue.  In this case,  it would  be better for the  government  to
raise  the  consumer  price  through  taxes  rather  than  higher  producer  prices.- 40 -
5.7  Finally,  the paper  turned  to metering  problems  that  might  affect
the ability to charge the theoretically  optimal prices. The analysis
concentrated  on road  use charges,  and it  was shown  that if different  uses
had to be charged  at the  same rate  the  optimal  rate  is a weighted  average
of the marginal  costs of each use, with the weights  being equal to the
compensated  derivatives  of demand  for  each  use  with respect  to the  charge.
The case of indirect  charging  was also  considered.  Here it  was shown  that
the optimal  policy  was to tax  all inputs  at a uniform  proportional  rate.
However,  if some inputs  could  not be taxed  at all, or their  taxation  was
limited  by concern  for "by-product"  distortions,  the taxes  on other  inputs
should  be raised  to the extent  that  such taxes  discourage  the  use of the
untaxed  (or under-taxed) input. The influence on charging policy of
distortions  elsewhere  in  the  economy  were  also  analyzed.- 41 -
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APPENDIX
THE  DESIGN  OF ROAD  USER  CHARGES
The purpose  of this appendix  is to present  a formal  analysis  of
road user charges  to justify  the statements  made in the main text  of the
paper. The analysis is conducted using models that are as simple as
possible,  given  the  problem  to be analyzed.  Thus the  analysis  is in terms
of a single  consumer  economy (or a large  number  of identical  consumers)
where there are fixed  produtcer  prices.  It is assumed  that the road user
cost bears entirely  on the production  sector  and that the government  is
able to raise revenue  through  lump-sum  taxation.  The last assumption  is
used  to avoid  the  revenue  raising  issues  that  are  dealt  with extensively  in
the  main  body of the  paper.  The  taxes  derived  here  are  therefore  those  that
are justified  on purely allocative  grounds.  The taxes higher  than those
derived  here would  have to be justified  in terms of the revenue  raising
arguments  discussed  in the  paper.
The  analysis is conducted through a  series of models with
different  assumptions  about  the  government's  tax  powers.  The first  assumes
that the road user cost does not vary by time of day (or  week,  month or
year)  or location  (urban,  inter-urban  or rural)  and  that  the  government  can
directly  tax road  use. It can also  be regarded  as applying  to the  setting
of road user charges for a particular  time period (peak  or off-peak  for
example) in a particular location,  provided  that this rate can be set
independently  from those  at other  times  or places.  This is a particularly
siaple  case,  but serves  as a  useful  benchmark.- 44 -
The second  model  is the  same  as the  first  except  that  road  use  can
no longer  be taxed directly,  but can only be charged  for by taxing  its
iiaputs.  The third  model  is the  same as the  second,  but it is  assumed  that
one of the inputs  cannot  be taxed.  The fourth  model returns  to the  direct
taxation  of road use, but assumes  that the same charge  must be made at
different  times and/or  locations.  Finally,  the fifth  model addresses  the
question  of how these  tax  policies  should  be adjusted  to take account  of
the  existence  of  other  taxes  in the  economy.
Model  1:  The  Model  With Direct  Taxation  of Road  Use
The level of road use is denoted  by X and the consumption  of
other  goods  is denoted  by Z.  Road  use reduces  the  productive  capability  of
the economy  by an amount  C(X),  where  C(.) is a convex  function.  Road  use
involves  the  consumer  in  purchasing  two  inputs,  R and  S, and  the  technology
is such  thar:
X  - F(R,S)
where  F(.,.)  is the  road  use  production  function.
If the goods  R, S, and Z are measured  in units that cost equal
amounts  to  produce,  the  production  constraint  can  be written  as:
R +  S  +  Z  - P  - C(X)
where  P is the  productive  capacity  of the  economy.
If  road  use  is charged  at rate  t,  the  consumer's  budget  constraint
can  be written  as:
R + S  + Z + t.X  - Y
where  Y is  the  consumer's  income.
The consumer  is assumed  to maximize  utility  subject  to the  budget
constraint,  and the solution can be expressed as an indirect  utility
function  V(t,Y).  The government  can  control  Y through  lump-sum  taxation  and
so its  problem  is to:- 45 -
maximize: V(t,Y)
subject to:  R(t,Y) +  S(t,Y) +  Z(t,Y) - P - C(X)
The consumer's budget constraint that lies behind the demand
functions  for  R, S and  Z implies  that  the  government's  budget  constraint  is
satisfied whenever  the production constraint is satisfied.  There is
therefore  no need  to include  the  government's  budget  constraint  explicitly.
The  lagrangean  for  this  problem  is:
L - V(t,Y) +  6.(P  - C(X) - R(t,Y) - S(t,Y) - Z(t,Y))
The  first-order  conditions  for  a maximum  are:
SL _V  AdC  (SF oR +  oFSS)  +R  +  oS  +  SZ
_ _  _  ~_  1-0_  _ 
S-t  ot  dX  TR  ot  6S  6t  ot  ot  St
6L  6V  dC  SF oR +  o  SFS  SR +S  +Z _  _+  +  +]0
TY  OSY  dX  oRS  TY  6S  oY  TY  TY  TY
Differentiation  of the consumer's  budget  constraint  with respect
to t  and  Y, respectively  gives:
oR + oS  +Z  t. (6F.R +SF.5S  + X - O
6t  oSt  St  TR St  dS 6t
SR  +  6s  6z  + t  F  (6FSR  +  6F.S
oY  TY  6Y  oR  oY  oS  oY
Substitution  of these  expressions  into  the first-order  conditions
produces:
_L  dC  SFS  R  +F  °S
Tt-  TR~~_  +t  _-  _)-J-
Set  dX  SeRSot  SSS  ot
SL  dC  6F  6R  S-F  S
o  a-  .[(-t).(  +  oF  )+l  -0
Oy-  aRdX  oR SY  SS  TY- 46 -
where  a  - 6V  the  marginal  utility  of income.
6Y
It is clear  that one solution  to these  first--  dLr conditions  is
that  a  - e  and t is set  equal  to the  marginal  cost of road use (excluding
the  private  costs  of buying  R and S).  It is, in  fact,  the  only  solution  to
these  equations  unless  the two expressions  of partial  derivatives  bear a
very  special  relationship  to each  other. 19
This  result,  that  externalities  should  be corrected  by a tax  equal
to their marginal  cost, is of course  well known as Pigouvian  taxation.
However,  it forms  a useful  benchmark  with  which to compare  the results  of
the  other  models.
Model  2:  The  Model  With  InDut  Taxation
This  model  is the  same  as the  first  except  that  direct  taxation  of
road use is not possible.  Instead,  there  are taxes  on the  two inputs  into
road transport,  R and S, at rates  tR and tS respectively.  The consumer's
budget  constraint  therefore  becomes:
(1  +  tR).R  +  (1  +  tS).S  +  Z  - Y
The production  constraint  is the same as before, and so is the
lagrangean  except  that  there  are  now  two  taxes  so that  indirect  utility  is
written  as V(tR,tS,Y).  The first-order  conditions  are  therefore  the same,
except that there is one for each tax rate.  However,  the results  of
differentiating  the  budget  constraint  with respect  to tR,  tS and  Y are:
19/  The relationship  would imply that the substitution  effects in the
demands  for  R and  S have no effect  on road  use.  In such  a case,  only
income  effects can alter road use and the lump-sum  becomes just as
effective  as  a tax  on road  use.- 47 .
6R  SS  SZ  R + (I  + tR)-_  + (1  + tS)- - +  -°
StR  StR  StR
(1  +  tR)  SR  + S  +  (1  tS).  *  +  _  °
6ts  6tS  StS
SR  +(+  6S  SZ (1  +  tR). *  (I  +  tS)*  +  -- 1
SY  SY  SY
Substitution  of these  expressions  into  the first-order  conditions
produces:
Stg  StR  dX  R  StR  dX6SS
. _a-R  -(0*  tR)  +  (  tS)  -R 
SL  SR  dCS6F  Ss  dCCS
o  _  .S  - e  _(  tR)  +  -t 5 (_*_  ts)  - SO  - o
ots  6st  dX oR-  6s  dX 6S
oL  W  a  6  ;oR  (dC.oF  tR)  + oS  (dC.6F  _t )  + 1]  - 0
oY-  -SY  dX  SR  6Y  dX  SS
As in the previous  model,  there is a clear solution  to these equations
involving  a  - 0.  Each  of the  two  tax  rates  are  set  equal  to the  other  term
in the  bracket.  Thus the tax  on R,  for  example,  is equal  to the  road  user
cost  of the  extra  road  use  produced  by one  extra  unit  of  R.
This result  is quite intuitive  but is made more interesting  by
further  consideration.  A utility  maximizing  consumer  will  choose  R and S  to
minimize  the private  cost of road  use, and  will therefore  choose  them so
that  their  consumer  prices  are  proportional  to their  marginal  products.  But
the  taxes  derived  above  are  also  proportional  to the  marginal  products,  and
so the taxes  will be proportional  to prices.  In other  words,  the inputs- 48  -
into  road use should  be taxed  at a unifoj--:  percentage  rate.  However,  an
equal  proportional  tax on the inputs  of an activity  is equivalent  to the
same  proportional  tax  on its  output.  The tax  on inputs  will therefore  have
the  same  effect  as the  direct  tax  on road  use, although  input  taxes  cannot
be so  well targeted  for  time  of day  or location.
Model  3:  The  Model  With Partial  Input  Taxation
This model is the same  as the one above  except  that only one of
the inputs can be taxed. This might arise through the administrative
difficulty  of taxing  particular  inputs,  such  as  household  labor,  or  because
the input  is used elsewhere  in the economy  where it is undesirable  for  it
to  be taxed. 20
Suppose  that  S  is  the  good  that  cannot  be  taxed.  This  affects  the
first-order  conditions  above  by  eliminating  the  first-order  condition  for
tS and setting  the value of tS equal to zero elsewhere.  The conditions
therefore  become:
6L  6R  (dC  6F - )6S  dC  6F
°  a-R -e- [sR*(c  tR)  + s  d.  R] - 0
6tr,  StR  dX 6R  6tR  dX 6S
6L  6R  dC  6F  6S  dC  6F _  a  - e- [_  (C  tR)  + ES.d  _F  l]  -
SY  TY  dXa  R  6Y  dX 6S
If  we add  R times  the  second  condition  to the  first  and  use  the
Slutsky  equation,  we obtain:
dC  6F  dC 6F 
SRR - (_  - tR)  + SSR..  0
dX  TR_  dX 6S
20/  For example,  Newbery  (1986)  cites  the  non-transport  uses  of diesel  and
its close  substitute,  kerosene,  as a reason  for not taxing  diesel  as
heavily  as one  would  wish  to otherwise.- 49 -
where  SRR and SSR are the substitution  effects  of the  price  of R
on the  demands  for  R and  S respectively.
Therefore:
dC  SF  SF
tR-_'  (_  +  [SSR/SRR)
dX  SR  6S
This expression for the optimal tax on the taxable input is
somewhat  more difficult  to interpret  than  the  previous  results.  This is  no
doubt  due to the fact that  a  genuine  restriction  on government  action  has
been introduced.  It is easiest  to  proceed  by considering  first  the  special
case where SSR is zero, so the tax on R has no substitution  effect  on
demand  for S. This means that the only advantage  taxation  of R has over
lump-sum  taxation  is the  reduction  in demand  for  R itself.  Thus the  tax  is
simply  given  by the  product  of the  margital  product  of R and the  marginal
road  user  cost.
As SRR is negative,  a positive  value for  SSR  would imply  a lower
rate  of tax  than  for  the  special  case.  The  reason  for  this  is that  taxation
of R will promote  the  use  of S and thus  partially  offset  the  effect  of the
reduction  in R on road  use. However,  this  case is unlikely  as it involves
substitution  in  production  between  R and S that  is high  enough  to outweigh
the disincentive  on road use. It is more likely  that SSR is negative,
implying that the use of inputs  decline  together.  This would have the
effect  of raising  tR. But tR would  only rise enough  to embody  all of the
tax that should have been on S if the ratio between the substitution
effects  equals  the  ratio  of their  demands  - implying  fixed  coefficients  in
production  between  S and  R.- 50  -
Model  4:  The  Model  With  Different  Uses  Charged  at the  Same  Rate
In this model we analyze  the effect  of recognizing  that it is
often  impossible  to charge  different  road  uses  at different  rates.  In  order
to keep the analysis  simple,  it is assumed  that the charge  can be levied
directly.  We also  dispense  with the  analysis  of purchased  inputs  into  road
use and assume instead that road use is a good that can be purchased
directly. 21
There  are two road  uses,  X1 and  X2, which  are taxed  at a uniform
rate.  The  budget  constraint  is  therefore:
(1  +  t).Xl  +  (1  +  t)-X 2 +  Z  - Y
The  production  constraint  is:
Xl  +  X2  +  Z  - P  - C(Xl,  X2 )
where  C(.,.)  is the  cost  function  of road  use,  generalized  to take
account  of the  different  costs  of different  uses.
The  lagrangean  for  the  problem  is  now:
L  - V(t) - e.[Xl  +  X2 +  Z  +  C(Xl,  X2)]
The  fir3t-order  conditions  for  a  maximum  are:
L  _  _--(XI  +  X2)  -e-SXl  . (1  + 6C  )  + SX 2 *  (1+  SC  )  +  JZ- 0
Et  St  5X 1 6t  5X2 6t
6L  e  - 8 X1  (1+  SC_)  5X 2 (1+  6C  )  +  _1  - °
TY  SY  5X 1 SY  TX 2 SY
Differentiation  of the  budget  constraint  with respect  to t and Y
respectively  produce:
21/  This is effectively  the same as assuming  that the  production  function
F(.,.)  is constant  returns  and  that  input  prices  are  fixed.- 51 -
Xl +  X2 +  (1  + t)  (Xl + 6X 2) +  8Z  _ 0
8t  8t  Et
(l  + t) *  (Sxl  +  8X 2) +  8Z _ l
6Y  6Y  TY
Substituting  these  terms  into  the  first-order  conditions  produces:
8L  .(Xl + X2) - e.tSC  .6Xl  +  6C  .6X2 - Xl - X2 - t.(6Xl  +  6X2)_  - 0
8Y-  6X 1 8t  6X2 6t  6t  6t
SL _  - e6a.C  .6X 1 +  6C  .6X 2 +  t.(SXl  +  8X2)]  _ 0
8Y-  8XX 1 dY  8X2 6Y  8Y  TY
Adding (X 1 +  X2) times  the second  condition  to the first,  and using the
Slutsky  equation,  we obtain:
Sit  °  +  S2t  ___  - t (Slt  +  S2t)
6xl  6X 2
where Slt and S2t are the compensated  derivatives  of the demand
for  X1 and  X2 respectively.
Therefore:
t  - (Slt _  +  S2t*  )  /  (Slt  +  S2t)
6xl  sx2
This tax  rule says  that  the tax  on the  two  road uses should  be a
weighted  average  of the  two  marginal  road  use  costs,  with  the  weights  being
the  compensated  effect  of tax  changes  on the  demand  for  each  road  use.
Model  5:  The  Effect  of Taxes  Elsewhere  in  the  Econom=
The models  considered  so far in this appendix  have assumed  that
there  are  no taxes  elsewhere  in the  economy.  The  purpose  of this  model  is
to consider  how the existence  of other  taxes  affect  the tax rules  we have
derived.- 52 -
The model used here is an extension  of model 2, where road  user
charges  are collected  through  input  taxes.  It is  extended  by considering  a
range  of non-transport  goods,  Zl,...,Zi,...,Zn  each of  which is taxed  at a
rate  ti.  The  consumer's  budget  constraint  now  becomes:
(l+tR).R  +  (l+tS).S  +  E(l+ti).Zi  -Y
where  the summation, E, runs over all i  (- 1,..  .,n) unless
otherwise  stated.
The economy's  production  constraint  becomes:
R +  S  +  E  Zi  - P - C(X)
The first-order  conditions  for  the  choice  of tR,  tS and  Y are  the
same as before  except  that differentials  of Z are replaced  by the sum of
the differentials of Zi. The results of differentiating the budget
constraints  are  now:
R  + (1  + tR)  _R +  (1  + ts)  s +  E(l + ti)-6Zi  _  O
6tR  6tR  6tR
(1  +  tR)-  +  S  +  (1  +  ts)-_  +  Z(l  +  ti).  zi  - 0
6ts  6t s 6ts
(1  +  tR)'  *_  +  (1  +  ts).  *_  +  E  (I  +  ti)  *  zi  _  1
TY  TY  6Y
Substitution  of these  expressions  into  the  first-order  conditions
produces:
6L  6R  dC  6F  65  dC  6F  6iR 
S -a-R  - e-[  (  tR)  +  - (  -ts)-ti *  i  R]  - 0
6tR  StR  dX SR  StR  dX 6S  StR
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StS  StS  dX SR  6ts  dX SS  StS- 53 -
6L  6R  dC  6F  6S  (dC  6F e  a  (  _-tR)  +  - .- _t 5 )-Etj  +  11 - o
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The addition  of R times  the last equation  to the first  equation
produces: 22
SRR *  (CR - tR) +  SSR.(CS - tS) - Z  SiR.ti - 0  (A.1)
where  CR  and  CS  denote  the  marginal  effect  of R  and  S
respectively  on the  value  of C(X);
SiR denotes  the substitution  effect  of the price  of R on
the  demand  for  Zi.
This  equation  can  be written  as:
tR - CR - -(SSR.(tS - CS) +  Eti-SiR]/SRR  (A.2)
However,  cost-minimization  by the  consumer  implies:
(1  +  tR).SRR  +  (1  +tS).SSR  +  E(1  +  ti)-SiR  - 0
The addition  of (A.1)  to  this  equation  produces:
SRR-(l +  CR) +  SSR(l +  CS) +  ESiR  - 0
This  enables  us to substitute  for  SRR  in (A.2):
[tR-CRJ/(l+CR)  - (SSR.(tS-CS)+Eti-SiR]/(SSR.(l  +Cs)+ESiaR
22/  A similar  equation  can  be obtained  from  the  second  equation.- 54 -
It is this equation that allows us  to see how the existence of
taxes elsewhere in the economy should affect the taxation of inputs into
road use.
This equation for the optimal tax on R is most easily interpreted
if  we begin by neglecting the road user cost element, so that CR and CS are
zero. In this case, the equation simply requires that the tax on good R
should be the weighted average of taxes elsewhere in the economy, with the
weights being equal to the compensated derivatives of demand for each good
with  respect  to  the price of  good R.  This  result is  the same  as that
obtained  by  Dixit and Newbery  (1985) and  can be  explained in  terms of
setting  the  tax on  good R  in a way  that minimizes  the effects  of the
distorted relative prices. Dixit and Newbery point out that there is no
guarantee that all the weights are positive, and so the tax on R could be
outside the range of the other taxes.
The introduction of road user costs has two effects. First, the
taxes  on  R  and  S  are  not  entirely  distortionary:  they  are  partly
corrective.  Therefore,  it is only  the distortionary part of  the  taxes,
(tR-CR) and (tS-CS), that enter the equation. Second, the resource cost of
consuming a unit of R or S is not just the producer price (which is scaled
to unity)  but  also  includes the marginal  road use cost. Therefore,  the
distortionary element of the taxation of R is divided by (l+CR) so that it
is  expressed  as  a  proportion  of  its resource cost  and  the SSR  in the
denominator of the right-hand side is multiplied by (l+CS) to represent the
resource cost of the substitution  effect.
In summary, the taxation of an input into road use should consist
of the marginal road use cost associated with that input plus an amount,
given by the formula above, that represents an adjustment to take account
of distortionary taxation elsewhere in the economy. This rule is derived- 55 -
under  the assumption  that the government  can levy lump-sum  taxes.  If,  on
the contrary, there is a need for distortionary  revenue  raising taxes,
additional taxation of inputs into road use may be Justified by the
criteria  discussed  in  Section  3  of this  paper.PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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